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Dr. CARB or: How I Learned to Stop 







Climate change is one of the largest environmental 
problems the world is currently facing. At the forefront of the 
climate change issue is the problem of carbon emissions. 
Environmentalists were hopeful that a national regulatory 
structure would be created with the enactment of the Clean Air 
Act in the 1970s. Since its enactment, however, it is clear the 
Clean Air Act was not the solution to the national carbon 
emissions problem environmentalists were hoping for. With the 
federal government failing to act, states have taken it upon 
themselves to regulate carbon emissions. California, with its 
enactment of the California Low Carbon Fuel Standard, has 
taken important steps to reduce carbon emissions through the 
regulation of carbon production in the creation of alternative 
fuels. But regulation of an interstate problem raises certain 
constitutional issues, namely the dormant Commerce Clause. The 
dormant Commerce Clause is the inverse of the Commerce 
Clause found in Article I, Section 8, clause 3 of the United States 
Constitution, which gives Congress the power to regulate 
commerce among the several states. Inversely, the dormant 
Commerce Clause prohibits a state from regulating commerce 
that extends beyond its borders. The United States Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals recently held that California’s Fuel Standard 
did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. This Note 
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analyzes the California Low Carbon Fuel Standard and the 
ruling of the Ninth Circuit. Based on this analysis, this Note 
explains what will and will not work when drafting emissions 
regulations after the Ninth Circuit’s decision. Finally, this Note 
makes recommendations to state legislatures attempting to draft 
carbon emissions regulations. These recommendations will 
hopefully aid states in drafting legislation that will avoid 
dormant Commerce Clause violations. 
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Modern environmentalists have looked at the federal 
government of the United States of America as the defender of 
the environment.1 Since the creation of the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) in December 1970, environmentalists 
                                                                                             
1. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: 
LAW SCIENCE AND POLICY 90–91 (6th ed. 2009) (describing the rise of the modern 
environmentalism movement which called for federal action to protect the 
environment).  
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have had high hopes for national regulation of the environment.2 
These hopes were fueled with the passage of legislation like the 
Clean Air Act (CAA)3 and Clean Water Act (CWA).4 But the 
federal government has yet to institute nation-wide regulatory 
schemes to protect the emission of greenhouse gasses.5 Proposed 
global warming legislation stalled in the United States Congress 
and has little chance of being passed in the near future.6 As a 
result, the some states have created their own climate change 
legislation.7 Due to the lack of federal legislation, states are left 
with the option of becoming the “laboratories of experimentation” 
described by former Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis.8 
Climate change, pollution, and protection of natural 
resources are difficult problems for states to address in the 
                                                                                             
2. See id. at 91 (noting how by 1970, environmental causes 
became ‘the favorite sacred issue of all politicians, all TV networks, all 
goodwilled people of any party’, citing THEODORE WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE 
PRESIDENT 45 (1973)).  
3. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7545 (West) (providing for the regulation of 
fuels). 
4. See generally 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006). 
5. See Nicholas Loris, Congress Should Stop Regulations of 
Greenhouse Gases, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Sept. 23, 2013), available at 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/09/congress-should-stop-
regulations-of-greenhouse-gases (giving the background of the EPA’s regulation 
of carbon-dioxide) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE AND THE ENVIRONMENT).  
6. Ben Geman, Heat Wave, Fires have Climate Change Activists 
Going on the Offensive, THE HILL, (July 6, 2012, 10:00AM), 
http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/236391-heat-wave-fires-leave-
some-climate-change-supporters-looking-to-go-on-offense (explaining that there 
is little hope for climate change legislation from Congress after the 2010 bill 
failed) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT). 
7. See State Legislation from Around the Country, CENTER FOR 
CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS (last visited Dec. 1, 2014, 3:44 PM), 
http://www.c2es.org/us-states-regions/key-legislation (listing the various state 
programs to address climate change) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).  
8. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught 
with serious consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the 
federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as 
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the 




United States’ federalist system.9 One of the biggest challenges 
facing states in their regulation of the environment is the 
constitutionality of the statutory schemes that would be required 
to regulate air pollution.10 States run the risk of regulating 
beyond their borders, protecting in-state interests at the expense 
out-of-state economies.11 According to one legal scholar, “[w]ith 
traditional environmental, command-and-control regulation, 
states can target air emissions, water pollution, and land use 
practices of facilities located wholly within state borders and 
often achieve meaningful progress. These approaches, however, 
are of limited effect in the area of climate change because of its 
national and international scope.”12 States also run the risk of 
regulating beyond their place in the federalist system.13 Due to 
the nature of environmental issues states are attempting to 
regulate, the efficacy of the regulatory scheme is dependent on 
the state’s ability to influence action in the stream of interstate 
commerce, the regulation of which is enumerated to Congress in 
the Constitution of the United States.14 
As Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution, also 
known as the Commerce Clause, establishes, “[t]he Congress 
shall have the Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes.”15 In contrast, the dormant, or negative, view on the 
Commerce Clause represents the concept that, because Congress 
has the enumerated power to regulate interstate commerce, the 
                                                                                             
9. See Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 
27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 60–65 (2003) (discussing the different viewpoints 
regarding environmental protection and federalism). 
10. See Klein, supra note 9, at 1–3 (introducing how the commerce 
clause affects a state’s ability to regulate environmental issues). 
11. See Klein, supra note 9, at 3 (“Such state efforts may have 
economic consequences for the free market and economic benefits for the 
regulating state, thus treading perilously close to the Court's expanding view of 
economic protectionism forbidden under the commerce clause.”).  
12. Alexandra B. Klass, Climate Change and the Convergence of 
Environmental and Energy Law, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 180, 198 (2013) 
(citations omitted). 
13.  See Klein, supra note 9, at 5 (highlighting instances when 
environmental measures have been invalidated as violating the Commerce 
Clause). 
14. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3 (granting Congress the 
power to regulate interstate commerce). 
15. Id. 
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states are forbidden from doing so.16 The purpose of the dormant 
Commerce Clause is the avoidance of economic and political 
protectionism created through state and local statutory 
schemes.17 Throughout history, the dormant Commerce Clause 
has been used by out-of-state entities to attack environmental 
regulations they claim unconstitutionally hinder their ability to 
compete in a particular state’s marketplace.18  
Even with this significant barrier to state action, state 
regulation of the environment is the best, if not the only, option 
available for regulating greenhouse gasses. This Note will focuses 
on a recent challenge undertaken by the Rocky Mountain 
Farmers Union (RMFU) against a regulatory scheme enacted by 
the State of California.19 The District Court for the Eastern 
District of California determined that California violated the 
dormant Commerce Clause when it attempted to regulate carbon 
emissions in transportation fuels.20 The Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit overruled the district court decision, which 
provides a beacon for states and environmentalists alike.21 This 
Note will analyze the rulings of the two courts and assess their 
impact on state legislation in the field, discussing what 
regulations will still work, what will not work, and where state 
regulatory schemes can go from here.22 Because of California’s 
                                                                                             
16. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 3 (1824) (stating that no part 
of the power to regulate interstate commerce can be exercised by the States). 
17. See Andrew D. Thompson, Public Health, Environmental 
Protection, and the Dormant Commerce Clause: Maintaining State Sovereignty 
in the Federalist Structure, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 213, 219 (2004) (describing 
the purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause as the prevention of potential 
hostilities due to economic protectionism and the protection of natural 
resources). 
18. See infra Part II. 
19. See generally Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 
F.3d 1070 (2013) (reviewing California’s Fuel Standard). 
20. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 
1086 (2013) (concluding California’s efforts “violated the dormant Commerce 
Clause by (1) engaging in extraterritorial regulation, (2) facially discriminating 
against out-of-state ethanol, and (3) discriminating against out-of-state crude oil 
in purpose and effect”); see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95480 (2010) (giving 
the purpose of California’s low-carbon fuel standard legislation). 
21. See Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d. at 1078 (finding the regulation 
did not “facially discriminate against out-of-state commerce”). 
22. See Sarah Kunkleman, Attorneys Say States Can Protect 





unique position as the only state permitted by Congress to 
attempt regulation of emissions from motor vehicles, the Ninth 
Circuit’s ruling is important as a guide for states attempting to 
enact legislation to regulate emissions. The ruling of the Ninth 
Circuit can be viewed as a preview of dormant Commerce Clause 
challenges to state regulation of other sources of greenhouse 
gasses.  
Part II of this Note will focus on the history of dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence from its theoretical development 
to its more modern analysis. Part III analyzes the text of 
California’s Fuel Standard. Part IV discusses RMFU’s challenge 
to the Fuel Standard in the federal trial and appellate courts. 
Part V analyzes what drafting techniques, in light of RMFU’s 
recent appellate court challenge, states can employ so 
environmental protection legislation will not violate the dormant 
Commerce Clause. Namely, states can ensure their legislation 
pursues a permissible aim, utilizes geographic factors that are 
directly tied to the reduction of carbon emissions and not to the 
protection of local economies, and finally employs alternative 
regulatory structures. Generally, this Note attempts to show 
that, while federal action in the forum of greenhouse gasses is 
lacking, state regulations can be an effective way of controlling 
the issue. 
 
II. History of the Dormant Commerce Clause 
 
 The dormant Commerce Clause is not an actual clause in 
the Constitution.23 “It is the Court which has imposed the policy 
under the dormant Commerce Clause . . . .”24 The dormant 
Commerce Clause finds its origins in the interstate commerce 
                                                                                                             
(BNA), at A-1 (Oct. 15, 2013) (opining that states can protect against dormant 
Commerce Clause challenges when drafting legislation). 
23. See Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant 
Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 Duke L.J. 
569, 571 (“[T]he simple fact is that there is no dormant commerce clause to be 
found within the text or textual structure of the constitution.”).  
24. W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 217 (1994) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
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clause and its contours have been developed over the years 
through judicial interpretation.25 
 
A. Theoretical Development 
 
The Supreme Court first addressed the “negative” 
Commerce Clause in Gibbons v. Ogden.26 Though the holding of 
Gibbons relied specifically on Article 6, Clause 2 of the 
Constitution, known as the Supremacy Clause, the dicta of Chief 
Justice John Marshall’s opinion seemed to lay the groundwork for 
virtually exclusive federal power over interstate commerce 
through the dormant Commerce Clause.27 This exclusive federal 
power is created by two restrictions on state power from the 
Commerce Clause.28 As one legal scholar has stated, “First, 
Congress can preempt state law merely by exercising its 
Commerce Clause power. Second, the Commerce Clause itself—
absent action by Congress—restricts state power; the grant of 
federal power implies a corresponding restriction of state 
power.”29 This implicit restriction on states limits their ability to 
regulate intrastate activities that impact interstate activities.30 
In Gibbons, New York attempted to monopolize the 
licensing of steamboat operators on New York waters.31 The New 
York law was enforced to the exclusion of other state licenses and 
                                                                                             
25. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); 
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 
(1986). 
26. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 19–20(1824) (highlighting the 
uncertain application of the Commerce Clause in areas where Congress has not 
yet legislated). 
27. See Klein, supra note 9, at 23–24 (explaining Chief Justice 
Marshall’s desire to establish a vast and exclusive federal commerce power 
limited only by the Constitution itself); See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 3 (noting the 
power to regulate commerce is general, and has no limitations except those that 
are prescribed in the Constitution itself). 
28. See Paul E. McGreal, The Flawed Economics of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191, 1191–92 (1998) (explaining the 
restrictions placed on state power by the Commerce Clause). 
29. Id. at 1192 (citations omitted). 
30. See id. at 1191 (describing the impact of the dormant 
Commerce Clause on the states). 
31. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 4–7 (existing New York law required a 




a federal licensing system.32 Chief Justice Marshall ruled that the 
New York law was “repugnant to that clause of the constitution of 
the United States, which authorizes Congress to regulate 
commerce . . . according to the laws of the United States . . . .”33 
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion favored a broad power of the 
federal government over interstate commerce.34 This holding 
“adopt[ed] a principle which acknowledge[d] the right of 
Congress, over a vast scope of internal legislation, which no one 
has heretofore supposed to be within its powers.”35 The Court 
acknowledged situations where states could enact laws that 
nevertheless would have an impact on interstate commerce, but 
distinguished the police power of the state from any power to 
interfere in commerce.36 The Court’s decision included health 
laws—such as quarantine laws—in the category of validly 
exercised police power, but stated that if a state passed a health 
law as pretext the enactments should be void.37 If “under the 
pretext of executing its power, [a state] pass[es] laws for the 
accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government” the 
Court would have the duty of striking down the law.38 The Court 
reasoned that the framers of the Constitution granted Congress 
plenary authority over interstate commerce in “the conviction 
that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the 
tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued 
relations among the Colonies and later among the States under 
the Articles of Confederation.”39 Though the distinction between 
state police power and state interference in interstate commerce 
                                                                                             
32. See id. at 4–5 (outlining the New York licensing procedure and 
the effect of the license on other states).  
33. Id. at 1. 
34. See Klein, supra note 9, at 24 (explaining Chief Justice 
Marshall’s opinion as “whittling down the role of the states in 
regulating . . . interstate commerce.”).  
35. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 19. 
36. See id. at 31 (explaining how a state’s police power may exist, 
but it cannot be inconsistent with an act of Congress); Trevor D. Stiles, 
Renewable Resources and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 4 ENVT'L & ENERGY L. 
& POL'Y J. 33, 58 (2009) (explaining the dichotomy of state action created by 
Chief Justice Marshall). 
37. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 20 (explaining that quarantine laws 
would be an acceptable exercise of power).  
38. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 423 (1819). 
39. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979) (describing 
the intent of the Framers of the Constitution). 
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may have been clear to Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons, the 
Court has been required to revisit the dormant Commerce Clause 
analysis in an attempt to deal with current issues.40 
 
B. Modern Analysis 
 
State statutes and regulations fall into three categories for 
dormant Commerce Clause analysis: (1) those that are facially 
discriminatory, (2) those that are facially neutral but with 
discriminatory purpose or effect, and (3) those that are not 
facially discriminatory but have an adverse effect on interstate 
commerce.41 This Note will discuss the two main tests used in 
analyzing these three categories, the virtual per se invalidity 
test42 and the Pike balancing test.43 Though political 
protectionism is also a facet of the application of the dormant 
Commerce Clause, this Note will focus on the RMFU’s claim of 
economic protectionism.44 The modern rationale of the dormant 
Commerce Clause comes from the need to limit economic and 
political protectionism by individual states.45 The test that is 
used depends on the nature of the state statute’s interference 
with interstate commerce.46 If the statute is facially neutral and 
regulates evenhandedly with only incidental effects on interstate 
                                                                                             
40. See Stiles, supra note 36, at 58 (stating that many state 
actions may fall clearly under the state police power and yet still fall short of 
constitutionality under disparate impact analysis).  
41. See Kathleen M. Sullivan & Noah Feldman, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW, 232–33 (18th ed. 2013) (describing the three modern categories of dormant 
commerce clause challenges).  
42. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 
(1978) (“[W]here simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a 
virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected.”). 
43. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) 
(introducing how to evaluate a state statute or regulation under the Pike 
balancing test). 
44. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 
2d 1071, 1086 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (explaining how economic protectionism shapes 
dormant Commerce Clause analysis). 
45. See Thomas Alcorn, The Constitutionality of California's Cap-
and-Trade Program and Recommendations For Design of Future State 
Programs, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 87, 122 (2013) (explaining the central 
purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause). 
46. See Thompson, supra note 17, at 223 (explaining the 




commerce, the Pike balancing test is applied.47 If the statute 
discriminates against interstate commerce on its face, in practical 
effect, or if its purpose is discriminatory, the virtual per se 
invalidity test is applied.48 The Supreme Court defines 
discrimination in relation to the Commerce Clause as 
“differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic 
interest that benefits the former and burdens the latter.”49 
 
1. Pike Balancing Test 
 
In Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., the Supreme Court 
determined whether legislation enacted by the State of Arizona 
violated the dormant Commerce Clause.50 Arizona’s legislation 
required cantaloupes grown in Arizona to be packaged in the 
state and transported in containers approved by a state official.51 
Bruce Church, Inc. had been shipping its high quality 
cantaloupes across the border to a processing factory in 
California, packing them with the California packaging 
company’s label, and then distributing them for sale in California 
and Arizona.52 Arizona brought suit against Bruce Church to 
ensure that their high quality product would be labeled as coming 
from Arizona thereby increasing the reputation of other farms in 
Arizona.53 In order to effectuate the Arizona legislation, Bruce 
Church would have to spend several months constructing a new 
packing facility in Arizona, at a cost of over $200,000.54 
                                                                                             
47. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (describing 
the approach to dormant Commerce Clause analysis under the balancing test). 
48. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336–37 (1979) 
(describing the alternative approach to the dormant Commerce Clause when a 
statute is discriminatory on its face or in practical effect). 
49. Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 
(1994). 
50. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 138 (1970) 
(evaluating a state law related to selling cantaloupes outside of the state).  
51. See id. at 138 (explaining the parameters of the Arizona law). 
52. See id. at 139–40 (describing the business practices of Bruce 
Church, Inc.). 
53. See id. at 142–43 (stating the local interest for the statute was 
to protect the reputation of Arizona growers). 
54. See id. at 140 (describing the consequences of Bruce Church, 
Inc. adhering to the Arizona statute). 
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The Court looked to whether a state statute “regulates 
even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and 
[whether] its effects on interstate commerce are only 
incidental.”55 The statute “will be upheld unless the burden 
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the 
putative local benefits.”56 Justice Potter Stewart, writing for the 
Court, went on to say that when a legitimate local interest is 
found, the extent the interference with interstate commerce will 
be tolerated is based on the nature of the interference and the 
degree to which it could be advanced with less impact.57 In his 
analysis of the legitimacy of the local interest involved, Justice 
Stewart found that the state’s interest in protecting the 
reputation of growers in the state and the state’s interest in 
maximizing financial returns to an industry within it, are 
legitimate.58 As the interest was legitimate and the statute was 
not facially discriminatory, there was a presumption of validity.59 
This presumption of validity was overcome by the fact that the 
regulation had a “far different impact, and quite a different 
purpose.”60  
The Court balanced the legitimate local interest of 
protecting growers reputations against requiring Bruce Church to 
construct a packaging plant at a cost of $200,000 rather than 
send its produce to a nearby California packaging plant, and 
found that the burden imposed on commerce was excessive in 
relation to its local benefits.61 Justice Stewart stated that the 
“nature of that burden is, constitutionally, more significant than 
its extent.”62 Justice Stewart concluded by stating “[s]uch an 
incidental consequence of a regulatory scheme could perhaps be 
                                                                                             
55. Id. at 142 (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of 
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)). 
56. Id. 
57. Id. (discussing the extent to which a legitimate local interest 
may burden interstate commerce). 
58. See id. at 143 (stating that the Arizona law did not fall under a 
protected category of local regulation of a safety field). 
59. See id. (listing the requirements for a presumption of validity 
of a state statute regulating produce packaging). 
60. Id. at 144. 
61. See id. (explaining the consequences of the law on the Arizona 
grower). 




tolerated if a more compelling state interest were involved.”63 The 
balancing test established in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. is applied 
to facially neutral statutes and regulations without a 
discriminatory purpose or effect that place an incidental burden 
on interstate commerce.64 As explained in Part IV, Section B of 
this note, the Pike balancing test is the correct test for analyzing 
the California Fuel Standard. 
 
2. Virtual Per Se Invalid Test 
 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of California applied a different test to the California Fuel 
Standard.65 The district court relied on Supreme Court’s rulings 
that laws facially discriminating against interstate commerce are 
virtually per se invalid.66 As the United States Supreme Court 
has stated, “[t]he clearest example of such legislation is a law 
that overtly blocks the flow of interstate commerce at a State's 
borders.”67 In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the State of 
New Jersey enacted a statute prohibiting the importation of solid 
waste originating outside of the state.68 Channeling Chief Justice 
Marshall’s dicta concerning the permissibility under the 
Commerce Clause of “health laws,” New Jersey’s law required 
that the commissioner of the State Department of Environmental 
Protection clear extraterritorial waste so as not “endangering the 
public health, safety and welfare.”69  
                                                                                             
63. Id. at 146. 
64. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 
2d 1071, 1084–85 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (explaining when the Pike balancing test is 
applied). 
65. See id. at 1090 (concluding that the Fuel Standard 
“impermissibly discriminates on its face against out-of-state entities”). 
66. See id. at 1088 (explaining that laws blocking the flow of 
interstate commerce are virtually per se invalid). 
67. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). 
68. See id. at 618–19 (describing, briefly, the nature of the statute 
in question). 
69. See id. (establishing the only permissible way for out of state 
waste to be dumped in New Jersey). The Court stated that the New Jersey law 
was dissimilar to the quarantine laws suggested by Chief Justice Marshall. Id. 
at 629. The Court found that the laws failed to follow precedent of quarantine 
laws found acceptable by the dormant Commerce Clause because the movement 
of items was not banned due to evils other than the nature of the items 
themselves. Id. at 628–29. (citing Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1908); Reid v. 
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In holding the statute invalid, the Court stated that the 
statute “[o]n its face . . . impose[d] on out-of-state commercial 
interests the full burden of conserving the State's remaining 
landfill space.”70 The Court explained that statutes placing the 
full burden on out-of-state commercial interest are virtually per 
se invalid under the Commerce Clause, regardless of the initial 
purpose they were enacted to serve.71 A facially invalid statute 
can only be constitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause if 
the state can “identify a non-protectionist and compelling local 
interest that cannot be served” by any non-discriminatory 
means.72 Justice Stewart found that the New Jersey statute, 
though cloaked in language the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
found compelling, was promulgated for a protectionist purpose.73 
The Court stated that “[c]ontrary to the evident assumption of 
the state court and the parties, the evil of protectionism can 
reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends.”74 Justice 
Stewart concluded by stating that the purpose of the New Jersey 
statute “may not be accomplished by discriminating against 
articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there 
is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently. 
                                                                                                             
Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902) and Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 
125 U.S. 465 (1888)). 
70. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 628. 
71. See id. at 626–27 (explaining the legislative intent of the 
statute is irrelevant under the virtual per se invalid test). 
72. CAROLYN ELEFANT & EDWARD A. HOLT, CLEAN ENERGY STATES 
ALLIANCE, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE RENEWABLE 
PORTFOLIO STANDARD PROGRAMS 5 (2011), available at 
http://www.cleanenergystates.org/resource-library/resource/cesa-report-the-
commerce-clause-and-implications-for-state-renewable-portfolio-standard-
programs-pdf (explaining the exception to the virtual per se invalidity test is a 
narrow one) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986) 
(explaining why Maine’s facially discriminatory statute is permissible under the 
Commerce Clause).  
73. See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626 (finding that New 
Jersey’s statute was passed for protectionist reasons); see also supra note 71 and 
accompanying text. 




Both on its face and in its plain effect, [the statute] violates this 
principle of nondiscrimination.”75  
 
C. State Success! 
 
“Only one facially discriminatory law has avoided 
invalidation . . . .”76 When California was drafting its Fuel 
Standard, the only example of a facially discriminatory law that 
was not held to be invalid came from Maine v. Taylor.77 In Maine 
v. Taylor, the Supreme Court was called upon to determine 
whether a Maine statute creating criminal liability for 
individuals who brought live baitfish into the state violated the 
dormant Commerce Clause.78 The state attempted to convince the 
Court that a congressional act had authorized the court to lower 
the level of scrutiny used to analyze the anti-live baitfish 
statute.79 The Supreme Court, agreeing with the District Court of 
Maine, held there was no such unambiguous authorization and 
that the virtual per se invalidity test of City of Philadelphia 
applied.80 The Court therefore had to find that the statute 
“serve[d] a legitimate local purpose, and the purpose [was not] 
one that [could] be served as well by available nondiscriminatory 
means.”81 The Supreme Court found that Maine had a legitimate 
local interest in protecting the state’s “unique population of wild 
fish” from the effects of baitfish parasites potentially introduced 
                                                                                             
75. See id. at 626–27 (explaining that states cannot exclude 
articles of commerce from other states unless there is a valid reason to treat 
them differently). 
76. ELEFANT & HOLT, supra note 72, at 5. See generally, Maine v. 
Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (finding that Maine’s facially discriminatory statute is 
constitutional). 
77. See id. at 5 (explaining that California only had one previous 
example of success to emulate); see also, supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
78. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137–38 (1986) (discussing 
the terms of the Maine statute in question). 
79. See id. at 138–40 (arguing that the Lacey Act allows wildlife 
legislation to be analyzed under a lower level of scrutiny than would otherwise 
be applied under the Commerce Clause).  
80. See id. at 148 (disagreeing with the argument of Maine and 
affirming the District Court of Maine in its application of the per se rule of 
invalidity). 
81. See id. at 140 (discussing what the Court must find to uphold 
Maine’s statute). 
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by imported fish.82 The Court also found that Maine had satisfied 
the second prong of the virtual per se invalidity test by presenting 
evidence that there was no legitimate non-discriminatory means 
of protecting the state’s wild fish population.83 
Maine is an important marker in the development of 
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence for two reasons. First, 
it demonstrates the application of the virtual per se invalidity test 
to a state statute protecting the environment within a state.84 
Second, it provides a guide for what constitutes an absence of 
non-discriminatory means of protecting these resources.85 In 
Justice John Paul Steven’s dissent in Maine, he criticized the 
majority for concluding “the State has no obligation to develop 
feasible inspection procedures that would make a total ban 
unnecessary.”86 Thus, in drafting legislation states still must be 
conscious of possible alternatives to their statutory and 
regulatory schemes that place less of a burden on interstate 
commerce. 
 
III. California Fuel Standard Legislation 
 
This part of the Note focuses on the California Low-
Carbon Fuel Standard (Fuel Standard) and the regulatory 
scheme it created.87 The CAA expressly prohibited state 
regulation of emissions from new motor vehicles.88 Congress 
provided California with latitude to create a test program “to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of clean-fuel vehicles in controlling 
                                                                                             
82. See id. at 142–43 (explaining that the parasites from the 
baitfish could introduce parasites and non-native species of fish, which would 
impact the state fish population unpredictably and possibly in a harmful way). 
83. See id. at 147 (finding that the “abstract possibility of 
developing acceptable testing procedures” to protect the native species of fish 
does not establish a “nondiscriminatory alternative”). 
84. See id. at 142–43 (following the two-step process under the per 
se invalidity test for determining that the statute was valid). 
85. See id. at 147 (noting that abstract possibilities are not less 
discriminatory means). 
86. See id. at 152 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
87. See generally CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95480–95490 (2010) 
(creating a regulatory scheme in order to limit carbon emissions). 
88. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2014) (expressly stating that states 
shall not “adopt or attempt to enforce any standard regulating the control of 




air pollution . . . .”89 A primary requirement was that the 
California program be, “in the aggregate, at least as protective of 
public health and welfare as applicable Federal standards.”90 
Other states were allowed either to adopt federal standards or 
the standards enacted by California.91 
California’s legislature acted by pronouncing the 
legitimate local interest of protecting the state’s air quality, water 
supply, coastlines, and natural environment, through the 
enactment of emissions regulations.92 The legislature stated that 
the environmental damage would have “detrimental effects on 
some of California's largest industries, including agriculture, 
wine, tourism, skiing, recreational and commercial fishing and 
forestry” and would “increase the strain on electricity supplies.”93 
The state legislature resolved to reduce emissions to the 
equivalent of their 1990 level by the year 2020.94 The California 
Air Resources Board (“CARB”) was charged with this task.95 
The California legislature passed Assembly Bill 32, the 
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006.96 The Act requires CARB 
to “issue regulations, including scoping and reporting 
requirements to achieve maximum technologically and 
                                                                                             
89. See id. § 7589(a) (outlining the establishment of a California 
pilot test program). 
90. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 
1078 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)) (requiring that the California 
program must be stricter in terms of protecting public health than the Federal 
standards). 
91. See 42 U.S.C. § 7589(f) (2014) (establishing a voluntary opt-in 
program for other states interested in adopting the test program created by 
California). 
92. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501(a) (West 2007) 
(“Global warming poses a serious threat to the economic well-being, public 
health, natural resources, and the environment of California.”). 
93. See id. § 38501(b) (explaining the negative effects that global 
warming has on industry and electricity supplies). 
94. See id. § 38550 (explaining that by January 1, 2008 the 
California Air Resources Board (CARB) will determine the emissions level of 
1990 and use that finding to determine the emissions limit equivalent to that 
level, to be achieved by 2020). 
95. See id. § 38510 (placing CARB in charge of monitoring and 
regulating sources of greenhouse gas in order to reduce the emission of 
greenhouse gasses). 
96. See id. § 38500 (incorporating the Global Warming Solutions 
Act of 2006 into the California Code); 2006 Cal. Legis. Serv. 488 (West) 
(enacting the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006). 
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economically feasible reductions.”97 In response to this order, 
CARB enacted various regulations including a cap-and-trade 
program to enforce limits on carbon emissions from a variety of 
domestic sources98 and regulations seeking to reduce greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions from the transportation sector.99 
CARB stated that the purpose of the Fuel Standard was to 
“reduce greenhouse gas emissions by reducing the full fuel-cycle, 
carbon intensity of the transportation fuel pool used in California, 
pursuant to the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 
2006.”100 CARB would accomplish this by enacting regulations 
that “appl[y] to any transportation fuel . . . that is sold, supplied, 
or offered for sale in California.”101 CARB was required to 
consider “the relative contribution of each source or source 
category to statewide greenhouse gas emissions.”102 As the Ninth 
Circuit has noted, “[i]n California, transportation emissions 
account for more than 40% of GHG emissions—the state’s largest 
single source.”103  
To reduce transportation emissions, CARB created a three 
part regulation system: (1) reducing emissions at the tailpipe 
source of new vehicles,104 (2) reducing the number of vehicle miles 
                                                                                             
97. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 
1079 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38561(a) and 38562 
(West 2007)) (providing examples of what Assembly Bill 32 required of CARB). 
98. See CAL. CODE REGIS. tit. 17 § 95801 (2012) (introducing the 
purpose of the California Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Program); CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(c) (West 2007) (establishing “a system of 
market-based declining annual aggregate emission limits for sources or 
categories of sources that emit greenhouse gas emissions.”). 
99. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE . § 38562(a) (West 2007) 
(requiring regulations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions). See also CAL. CODE 
REGS. tit. 13, § 1961.1 (2006) (regulating greenhouse gas exhaust emissions from 
2009 through 2016 Model Passenger Cars, Light-Duty Trucks, and Medium-
Duty Vehicles). 
100. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95480 (2010) (stating the 
purpose of the Low-Carbon Fuel Standard). 
101. Id. § 95480.1 (noting which type of fuel the California Low 
Carbon Fuel Standard regulations applied to). 
102. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38561(e) (explaining that 
the state board shall take into account relative contributions of different sources 
to global warming). 
103. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1079 
(9th Cir. 2013). 




travelled,105 and (3) reducing the greenhouse gasses emitted in 
the production of transportation fuels through the Fuel 
Standard.106 The first two parts of the system focus on demand 
through the sale of new vehicles and the use of vehicles by 
consumers.107 “The Fuel Standard . . . is directed at the supply 
side, creating an alternate path to emissions reduction by 
reducing the carbon intensity of transportation fuels that are 
burned in California.”108  
The problem with supply side regulation of greenhouse 
gas emissions is the location of the supply. California’s fuel 
standard regulates fuels that are sold or imported into 
California.109 Because of it’s insufficient in-state supply of 
feedstock—raw materials used to make alternative fuels like 
corn, sugar cane, or oil—California is forced to regulate activity 
outside of the state.110 California does so not by reaching outside 
of the state but regulating the fuel, or fuel stocks, as they enter 
the state to be consumed or created into alternative fuels.111 This 
is where the dormant Commerce Clause challenge originates. 
The foundation of the Fuel Standard’s regulation of carbon 
emissions is the focus on the lifecycle measurement of carbon 
intensity.112 Carbon intensity is “the amount of lifecycle 
                                                                                             
105. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65080 (West 2011) (directing 
transportation planning agencies to create a sustainable communities strategies 
implementing the goals of emissions reductions proposed by CARB including the 
recording of vehicle miles travelled). 
106. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95480–95490 (establishing the 
California Fuel Standard). 
107. See Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1079 (“The Tailpipe and VMT 
[vehicle miles travelled] standards work on the demand side; they aim to lower 
the consumption of GHG-generating transportation fuels.”).  
108. Id. at 1079–80. 
109. See CAL. CODE. REGS. tit. 17 § 95480.1 (2010) (stating that the 
Fuel Standard “applies to any transportation fuel . . . that is sold, supplied, or 
offered for sale in California”). 
110. See Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1082–83 (explaining how 
California evaluated feedstocks from the Midwest and Brazil, in addition to in-
state feedstock, with the Fuel Standard).  
111. See id. at 1080 (explaining that California’s Fuel Standard 
regulates the supply side by requiring fuel blenders to keep the average carbon 
intensity of its total volume of fuel below a certain level). 
112. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95482–95483 (2010) 
(establishing the average carbon intensity requirements for gasoline, diesel, and 
alternative fuels). 
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greenhouse gas emissions, per unit of energy of fuel delivered, 
expressed in grams of carbon dioxide equivalent per mega joule 
(gCO2E/MJ).”113 Under the Fuel Standard carbon intensity is 
measured throughout the lifecycle of the fuel.114 “Lifecycle 
greenhouse gas emissions” are defined as: 
 
[T]he aggregate quantity of greenhouse gas 
emissions . . . related to the full fuel lifecycle, 
including all stages of fuel and feedstock 
production and distribution, from feedstock 
generation or extraction through the distribution 
and delivery and use of the finished fuel to the 
ultimate consumer, where the mass values for all 
greenhouse gases are adjusted to account for their 
relative global warming potential.115 
 
The Fuel Standard established a declining annual cap on 
average carbon intensity starting in 2011 and culminating in a 
10% decrease by 2020.116 Fuel producers are required to remain 
below the cap requirements for each year.117 Credits and deficits 
are created for amounts producers are above or below the cap.118 
“Credits can be used to offset deficits, may be sold to other 
blenders, or may be carried forward to comply with the carbon 
intensity cap in later years.”119 Credits are generated quarterly120 
                                                                                             
113. Id. at § 95481(16). 
114. See id. (defining carbon intensity). 
115. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95481(a)(38) (2010). 
116. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95482(b) (2010) (delineating the 
required reduction in average carbon intensity for gasoline and gasoline 
substitutes from 2011 to 2020); Cal. Exec. Order No. S-01-07 (Jan. 1, 2007), 
available at www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/eos0107.pdf (ordering “that a statewide 
goal be established to reduce the carbon intensity of California’s transportation 
fuels by at least 10 percent by 2020”). 
117. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95482(a) (2010) (describing the 
expectations of fuel producers). 
118. See id. at § 95485(a) (supplying the formula used for producers 
to calculate credits and deficits). 
119. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1080 
(9th Cir. 2013) (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95485 (2010)). 
120. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95485(b) (2010) (establishing 




and may be bought and sold like commodities in the market 
established by the Fuel Standard.121 
One of the main issues with creating a standard to 
regulate transportation fuels in a state is that for the regulation 
to be effective the state legislature must do one of two things: (1) 
require that all fuels be produced inside the state (something that 
is both constitutionally impossible under the Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence and practically impossible due to demand, 
facilities, and resources required),122 or (2) impose carbon 
emission requirements on transportation fuels that are imported 
into the state.123 The Fuel Standard attempts the second method 
by utilizing the lifecycle analysis of carbon emissions.124 Through 
the lifecycle analysis CARB determines the carbon emissions for 
every step that goes into producing a fuel from the blendstock.125 
Individual iterations of a lifecycle, called a pathway, are assigned 
a carbon intensity value.126 These pathways are used to 
determine the carbon intensity value of the production of a 
particular type of fuel.127 In order to have producers participate in 
the Fuel Standard marketplace, where credits for carbon 
intensity are traded, fuels must be compared based on the totality 
of the carbon emissions of their production.128 
In order to compare the lifecycle emissions of fuel 
produced from a variety of blendstocks, California utilized the 
                                                                                             
121. See id. at § 95485(c) (explaining the Fuel Standard market and 
how it can used by producers). 
122. See supra Part B (addressing modern constitutional analysis of 
the dormant Commerce Clause). 
123. See Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1081 (“[T]he climate-change 
benefits of biofuels such as ethanol, which mostly come before combustion, 
would be ignored if CARB's regulatory focus were limited to emissions produced 
when fuels are consumed in California.”). 
124. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95481(a)(38) (2010) (defining 
lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions). 
125. See id. (including every step of the fuel creation process in the 
definition of lifecycle analysis); see also id. at § 95481(a)(14) (defining blendstock 
as a component that is either used as a fuel or is combined with other 
components to create a fuel used in a motor vehicle). 
126. See id. § 95481(a)(14) (explaining that each blendstock 
corresponds to a pathway). 
127. See id. § 95481(a)(16) (defining carbon intensity). 
128. See Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1081 (“An accurate 
comparison is possible only when it is based on the entire lifecycle emissions of 
each fuel pathway”).  
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Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy Use in 
Transportation Model (GREET).129 California modified the 
GREET Model, now aptly named CA-GREET, to incorporate 
“detailed information about local conditions, including 
California's stringent environmental regulations and low-carbon 
electricity supply.”130 Fuel producers are given three ways to 
comply with the reporting requirements of the Fuel Standard.131 
Method 1 involves utilizing the default pathways issued by 
CARB.132 Fuel producers are able to rely on Table 6 provided in 
Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, § 95486(b)(1) to determine the average 
value of carbon intensity for the creation of gasoline or gasoline 
alternatives.133 Method 2A allows a fuel producer to propose 
modifications to one or more inputs of the CA-GREET Model or 
modifications to one or more inputs to an alternative model used 
to generate a new pathway.134 The fuel producer must show “that 
the proposed Method 2A . . . is at least 5.00 grams CO2-eq/MJ 
less than . . . calculated under Method 1 . . . [and that the 
producer] can and expects to provide in California more than 10 
million gasoline gallon equivalents per year.”135 Method 2B allows 
for even more customization by the fuel producer, allowing 
creation of a new pathway provided that it is not already listed in 
the default pathways issue and that it is scientifically 
defensible.136  
                                                                                             
129. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95481(b)(14) (2010) (explaining 
the acronym GREET). 
130. See Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1082 (discussing how CA-
GREET works). 
131. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95486 (2010) (establishing the 
different methods available to fuel producers to determine carbon intensity 
values). 
132. See id. § 95486(b)(1) (stating that to determine carbon 
intensity values under Method 1 the default pathways created by CARB, 
through utilization of the CA-GREET data, are used). 
133. See id. at § 95486(b) (displaying the relevant data in Table 6). 
134. See id. § 95486(c) (providing an alternative to Method 1 by 
allowing customization of the pathway determination via Method 2A). 
135. See id. § 95486(e)(2)(A)–(B) (stating the requirements for a 
proposed Method 2A to be approved). 
136. See id. § 95486(d) (allowing for the creation of a new pathway 




Location plays a major role in the determination of carbon 
intensity.137 In a Ninth Circuit opinion, Judge Ronald Gould 
discussed the relevant example of ethanol produced through 
fermentation of feedstock.138 The opinion stated that under CA-
GREET the ethanol’s carbon intensity is determined by 
considering: 
 
(1) growth and transportation of the feedstock, with 
a credit for the GHGs absorbed during 
photosynthesis; (2) efficiency of production; (3) type 
of electricity used to power the plant; (4) fuel used 
for thermal energy; (5) milling process used; (6) 
offsetting value of an animal-feed co-product called 
distillers' grains, that displaces demand for feed 
that would generate its own emissions in 
production; (7) transportation of the fuel to the 
blender in California; and (8) conversion of land to 
agricultural use.139 
 
Under this analysis, “[f]actors related to transportation, 
efficiency, and electricity are correlated with a plant’s location in 
the Midwest, Brazil, or California.”140 Judge Gould emphasizes 
the importance of location in the CA-GREET factors by stating 
that the California production facilities are newer and more 
efficient so they receive a discount under the model.141 California 
is hurt, however, by the fact that there is no corn grown for 
ethanol in the state.142 This forces producers in California to 
                                                                                             
137. See id. § 95486(b) (establishing different default carbon 
intensity ratings in Table 6 depending on the location of the production facility). 
138. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 
1082–84 (9th Cir. 2013) (discussing the treatment of ethanol under the CA-
GREET Model). 
139. Id. at 1083. 
140. See id. (describing the location analysis for determining the 
carbon intensity values for a pathway). 
141. See id. (explaining the intricacies of carbon intensity analysis 
under CA-GREET) 
142. See id. (explaining that California ethanol producers have to 
import raw corn for ethanol). 
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expend carbon importing the fuel stock.143 The Midwest and 
Brazil have domestic corn production and, therefore, fare better 
in that respect.144 
After this “big picture” overview of California’s Low 
Carbon Fuel Standard this Note will focus on the challenge to the 
legislation made by the Rocky Mountain Farmer’s Union.145 
 
IV. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union 
 
 The Rocky Mountain Farmers Union (RMFU) is a 
“progressive, grassroots organization founded in 1907” to 
represent family farmers in Wyoming, Colorado, and New 
Mexico.146 Its goal is sustaining rural communities, wise 
stewardship and use of natural resources, and protection of the 
region’s food supply.147  
 
A. District Court 
 
 In December 2009, RMFU (along with several other 
organizational plaintiffs) brought suit against James Goldstene, 
then Executive Officer of CARB, in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of California asking for declaratory 
and injunctive relief against CARB for the imposition of the Fuel 
Standard.148 
                                                                                             
143. See id. (stating that raw corn imported for ethanol is heavier, 
and therefore more carbon intensive than finished fuel product coming from the 
Midwest and Brazil). 
144. See id. (explaining that, based on CA-GREET pathways, the 
Midwest expends the least amount of carbon transporting fuel). 
145. See generally Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 
F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013); Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. 
Supp. 2d 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 
146. See About Us, ROCKY MOUNTAIN FARMERS UNION, 
http://www.rmfu.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2014, 7:30 PM) (describing the 
history of the Rocky Mountain Farmers Union) (on file with the WASHINGTON 
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
147. See id. (“RMFU is dedicated to sustaining our rural 
communities, to wise stewardship and use of natural resources, and to 
protection of our safe, secure food supply.”). 
148. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 
2d 1071, 1078–79 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (explaining the nature of the suit against 






1. RMFU’s Arguments 
 
RMFU moved for declaratory judgment and an order 
enjoining enforcement of the fuel standard.149 RMFU was 
concerned that the Fuel Standard would “effectively bar Midwest-
produced ethanol from the California market.”150 Other groups 
joined the RMFU in their concern over the constitutionality of the 
Fuel Standard stating that, if allowed to stand, the law would 
“give other states permission to defy the intent of Congress” 
thereby allowing the “establish[ment of] a patchwork of fuel 
regulations that would greatly complicate the nation's fuel 
infrastructure and potentially limit the trade of fuel and fuel 
components between states.”151 In RMFU’s motion for summary 
judgment, they argued that the fuel standard violated the 
dormant Commerce Clause and was preempted by federal law.152  
RMFU advanced its dormant Commerce Clause claim by 
stating that the California Fuel Standard discriminated against 
Midwest corn ethanol producers and importers by “assigning 
them relatively higher total carbon intensity values vis-a-vis 
California corn ethanol producers.”153 RMFU asserts the Fuel 
Standard assigns these values even though the California 
producers utilize “substantially the same production methods to 
produce substantially the same product.”154 RMFU asserted that 
                                                                                                             
Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2011) 
(No. 1:09-cv-02234), 2009 WL 5421971 (stating prayer for relief and filing date). 
149. See id. at 1078 (explaining the procedural history of the court’s 
opinion). 
150. Ethanol Producers Sue Over California's Low-Carbon Rule, 30 
No. 14 ANDREWS ENVTL. LITIG. REP. 6, Feb. 3, 2010, at 1 [hereinafter Ethanol 
Producers Sue] (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); see also Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief, supra note 148, at 12 (explaining the effects and the 
consequences of the Fuel Standard). 
151. See Ethanol Producers Sue, supra note 150, at 2 (quoting the 
joint statement of Growth Energy and the Renewable Fuels Association). 
152. See Rocky Mountain, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1078 (briefly outlining 
the plaintiffs arguments). RMFU’s preemption argument is beyond the scope of 
this note. 
153. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra 
note 148, at ¶¶ 78–91 (outlining how the Fuel Standard violates the dormant 
Commerce Clause). 
154. Id. at ¶ 81. 
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California has effectively “erected a barrier to Midwest corn 
ethanol around its borders.”155 
 According to the RMFU, California impermissibly 
regulated and interfered with the channels of interstate 
commerce through subjecting out-of-state producers to higher in-
state burdens due solely to their location.156 RMFU claimed the 
interference is unconstitutional because the Fuel Standard ties 
higher carbon intensity values to the out-of-state producers 
interstate shipping decisions.157 RMFU argued the Fuel Standard 
facially discriminated against interstate commerce by requiring 
approval of interstate shipping, delivery, and distribution 
methods before out-of-state producers could generate credits.158 
In an effort to bolster its argument the RMFU included a claim 
that the Fuel Standard also discriminated in practical effect.159 
The facially discriminatory and the practical effect 
arguments place the Fuel Standard under the purview of City of 
Philadelphia’s virtually per se invalid test.160 RMFU emphasized 
the applicability of the virtually per se invalid test by stating that 
“[t]he burden of the [Fuel Standard] on interstate commerce in 
corn ethanol is clearly excessive in relation to any purported local 
benefits.”161 The Fuel Standard would “not result in any 
measurable global climate change, nor in any measurable 
reduction of the effects of global warming. California's share of 
those immeasurable changes and reductions is likewise 
immeasurable, meaning the [Fuel Standard] provides no local 
benefit to the state.”162 RMFU also argued the Fuel Standard 
amounted to economic protectionism through its goal of replacing 
                                                                                             
155. Id.  
156. See id. at ¶82 (stating that California interferes with the 
channels of interstate commerce by imposing a higher burden on out-of-state 
producers merely because they ship into California). 
157. See id. (explaining the connection between California’s action 
and the interstate commerce of the RMFU). 
158. See id. at ¶ 83 (arguing that the imposition of requirements on 
shipping methods facially discriminates against interstate commerce). 
159. See id. at ¶ 84 (stating that the Fuel Standard, actually and 
practically, regulates wholly outside of California). 
160. See supra Part II.B.2 (describing the virtually per se invalid 
test). 
161. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 





imported fuel-stocks with those produced in state, thereby 
keeping more money in the state.163 
 RMFU in its motion for summary judgment requested the 
court grant relief in the form of a declaratory judgment that the 
Fuel Standard violates federal law and permanent and 
preliminary injunctions against California enforcing the Fuel 
Standard.164 
 
2. CARB’s Arguments 
 
 CARB responded to the RMFU’s motion for declaratory 
judgment by arguing the RMFU had not carried their burden in 
showing the Fuel Standard discriminated against interstate 
commerce.165 CARB began by showing that the lifecycle analysis 
employed by the Fuel Standard is internationally recognized as 
the method for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.166 CARB also 
attempted to counter the argument that the Fuel Standard 
assigns lower carbon intensity ratings to California producers of 
ethanol by pointing out that the CA-GREET model did not assign 
California the lowest value for any ethanol type.167 CARB 
concluded their rebuttal of the facial discrimination claim by 
explaining the inclusion of the 2A and 2B methods of carbon 
intensity rating.168 
                                                                                             
163. See id. at ¶ 85 (explaining that CARB expects a decreased in 
Midwest imported ethanol while California ethanol production remains 
constant). 
164. See id. at 19–20 (requesting the district court take the listed 
actions). 
165. See Defendants And Defendant-interveners’ Supplemental 
Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In Opposition To RMFU’s Motion For 
Summary Judgment at 6–7, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 
F. Supp. 2d 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 1:09-CV-02234-LJO-DLB) 2011 WL 
1233984 [hereinafter Defendant’s Response] (stating that the party challenging 
the statue has the burden of showing discrimination and that the RMFU had 
not carried that burden). 
166. See id. at 7 (explaining that two of the other plaintiffs (RFA 
and Growth Energy) in the case acknowledge the efficacy of lifecycle analysis). 
167. See id. at 8 (stating that out-of-state producers of cane ethanol 
receive a better rating than California producers).  
168. See id. at 9 (describing the alternative carbon intensity 
valuation methods provided for in the Fuel Standard). 
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 CARB also argued that RMFU had failed to show evidence 
that the Fuel Standard actually had a discriminatory effect on 
Midwest ethanol.169 Midwest ethanol plants continue to be built 
and existing plants continue to be purchased.170 CARB also 
produced evidence that Midwest ethanol was selling in 
California.171 CARB demonstrated that ethanol from the Midwest 
was being sold in California for more than it would have in other 
western United States markets.172 Evidence was presented that 
Midwest producers were achieving lower carbon intensity ratings 
than California producers.173 
CARB concluded its rebuttal to RMFU’s dormant 
Commerce Clause claim by arguing that the Fuel Standard 
places no burden on interstate commerce and therefore was 
subject to Pike Balancing.174 In the alternative, CARB argued 
even if the Fuel Standard was subject to strict scrutiny it 
survives because it serves a compelling state interest and cannot 
be achieved by any non-discriminatory means.175 
 
3. The District Court’s Ruling 
 
On December 29, 2011 the district court granted RMFU’s 
request for preliminary injunction and entered judgment for 
                                                                                             
169. See id. at 11 (stating that the crucial inquiry is whether or not 
market share of out-of-state producers is reduced and that the plaintiffs have 
produced no evidence to prove this). 
170. See id. at 13 (explaining that the Fuel Standard has not killed 
the ethanol production market in the Midwest). 
171. See id. at 14 (showing that Midwest ethanol had two registered 
carbon intensities for sale in California). 
172. See id. at 15 (stating that Midwest ethanol was sold for a 
higher price than it would be sold in Phoenix or the Pacific Northwest). 
173. See id. (explaining that five current and twenty future 
Midwest producers had carbon intensity ratings lower than California 
producers). 
174. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 
2d 1071, 1085 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (presenting CARB’s argument that strict 
scrutiny analysis should not apply because the Fuel Standard is “a neutral law 
that applies evenly”). 
175. See Defendant’s Response, supra note 165, at 16 (arguing that 
California is not closed to Midwest ethanol and that the lifecycle analysis is the 




RMFU against CARB on RMFU’s dormant Commerce Claim.176 
The court did so on two grounds: (1) the court held the Fuel 
Standard regulations discriminate against out-of-state energy 
producers, and (2) the court held that California attempted to 
regulate activities outside of its borders.177 
 The district court ruled that because the CAA did not give 
express or unambiguous authority for California to violate the 
Commerce Clause, the Fuel Standard did not survive Commerce 
Clause scrutiny.178 The court then analyzed the extent to which 
the fuel standard discriminated against interstate commerce.179  
Focusing on the tables the statute used to provide the 
default pathways for different blendstocks from varying 
regions,180 the court found that, when the same production 
processes and blendstocks were used, the Fuel Standard 
“assign[ed] a higher [carbon intensity] on the basis of origin 
alone.”181 The court dismissed CARB’s argument that the figures 
used for the default pathways were based on scientific methods 
rather than location.182 The court stated that there were 
“favorable assumptions [for] California” in the figures used for 
the carbon intensity calculation and concluded “[t]his 
discriminates against interstate commerce.”183 The court also 
decided that, “tying carbon intensity scores to the distance a good 
travels in interstate commerce discriminates against interstate 
commerce.”184 Furthermore, the court dismissed the argument 
that the differences in the methods available to producers to 
                                                                                             
176. See Rocky Mountain, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1105 (issuing orders in 
the case). 
177. See Klass, supra note 12, at 197 (explaining the ruling of the 
District Court). 
178. See Rocky Mountain, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1084 (determining 
that the Fuel Standard was subject to scrutiny under the Commerce Clause). 
179. See id. at 1085–90 (analyzing the impact of the fuel standard 
on interstate commerce). 
180. See id. at 1087 (stating that the Table 6 “explicitly 
differentiate[s] among ethanol pathways based on origin.”); see also Cal. Code 
Regs. tit. 17, § 95486(b)(1) (2010) (displaying Table 6 and its relevant data). 
181. See Rocky Mountain, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1087 (evaluating the 
Fuel Standard’s assessment of in-state and out-of-state ethanol pathways). 
182. See id. at 1087–88 (outlining the arguments of CARB against 
the Commerce Clause challenges to the default pathways). 
183. See id. at 1088 (explaining why the Fuel Standard “offends the 
Commerce Clause). 
184. Id. 
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determine the carbon intensity of their product did not allow the 
statute to survive the Commerce Clause.185 The potential for 
producers to define new pathways to determine carbon intensity 
was at the sole discretion of CARB and therefore it was “no 
defense to describe methods that might allow amendment of the 
LCFS in a manner that might ameliorate the discriminatory 
impact of the regulation.”186 
Ultimately, the court’s analysis of the Fuel Standard did 
not fully grasp the approach of CARB in assigning values for 
carbon intensity. By focusing on the methods and materials used 
to produce ethanol, CARB successfully avoided the issue of 
location. If CARB assigned carbon intensity values solely based 
on the region the ethanol originated from, then the district court’s 
analysis would have been correct. 
 Instead, the court unjustifiably allowed regulation of 
conduct outside of the state’s borders.187 The Fuel Standard 
incentivized certain methods of production in an attempt to 
change the behavior of entities wholly outside the state.188 The 
court also determined that the Fuel Standard “impermissibly 
regulates the channels of interstate commerce.”189 The court 
found that this type of regulation, replicated by various states, 
would result in the Balkanization of the ethanol market.190 
The court held the statute facially discriminates against 
interstate commerce and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny 
                                                                                             
185. See id. at 1089 (“Moreover, the Method 2A and Method 2B 
procedures in the [Fuel Standard] do not alter this Court’s conclusion that the 
[Fuel Standard] discriminates on its face against out-of-state corn ethanol.”). 
186. Id. at 1089–90 (emphasis in original). 
187. See id. at 1090–93 (delineating RMFU’s argument for 
impermissible control of activities beyond California’s border); see generally 
Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1978) (establishing control beyond a state’s 
borders as an impermissible exercise of state power under the Commerce 
Clause). 
188. See Rocky Mountain, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1091 (describing the 
practical effect of the regulation as controlling conduct wholly outside of 
California). 
189. See id. at 1092 (explaining that the Fuel Standard could 
influence the decision of a producer to use rail instead of a truck or a ship to 
transport materials). 
190. See id. (stating that the Fuel Standard would influence 





analysis.191 The district court proceeded to apply the virtual per 
se invalidity test, asking whether the fuel standard served a 
legitimate local purpose and whether California lacked a non-
discriminatory alternative.192 The court noted that, under 
Massachusetts v. EPA, “that a state has a local and legitimate 
interest in reducing global warming.”193 It then cautioned that 
though the purpose of the legislation was “legitimate,” it cannot 
“be achieved by the illegitimate means of isolating the State from 
the national economy.”194 The court held that CARB failed to 
carry the burden in showing there were no nondiscriminatory 
alternatives to the fuel standard.195 The court stated that though 
the alternatives “may be less desirable, for a number of reasons, 
[CARB has] failed to establish there are no nondiscriminatory 
means by which California could serve its purpose of combating 
global warming through the reduction of GHG emissions.”196 
 The district court concluded by finding for RMFU and 
stating that California’s Fuel Standard “impermissibly treads 
into the province and powers of our federal government, reaches 
beyond its boundaries to regulate activity wholly outside of its 
borders, and offends the dormant Commerce Clause.”197 
 
B. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
 
 In reviewing the appeal of the CARB, the Ninth Circuit 
reviewed the grant of summary judgment under a de novo 
standard198 and the grant of preliminary injunction under an 
                                                                                             
191. See id. at 1089 (determining the level of scrutiny to be applied 
to the statute). 
192. See id. at 1093 (presenting the constitutional test required 
when a statute facially discriminates against interstate commerce). 
193. Id. (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519, 522 
(2007)). 
194. Id. at 1088–89 (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 
437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978)). 
195. See id. at 1093–94 (stating that the court was not convinced by 
California’s arguments “that the goal of reducing global warming cannot be 
adequately served by nondiscriminatory alternatives”). 
196. Id. at 1094. 
197. Id. 
198. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 
1086–87 (9th Cir. 2013) (determining the standard of review for appeals of 
summary judgment grants); see also CRM Collateral II, Inc. v. TriCounty Metro. 
 
6 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 1 (2014) 
 
368 
abuse of discretion standard.199 The Ninth Circuit reversed the 
decision of the district court by holding that the Fuel Standard 
was not facially discriminatory and therefore the trial court failed 
to apply the correct test in analyzing the statute.200 
 The Ninth Circuit first determined the district court erred 
in its analysis of the CA-GREET pathways.201 Rather than 
focusing on the pathways themselves for comparison, the court 
instead focused on the end product.202 The court found that, 
regardless of the production method, ethanol was end product.203 
Furthermore, the appeals court held that the district court 
erroneously excluded pathways from their analysis.204 In fact, the 
district court excluded sugar cane ethanol, predominantly from 
Brazil, and “all GHG emissions related to transportation, 
electricity, and plant efficiency from comparison,” before 
concluding that the fuel standard is facially discriminatory on the 
basis of origin. 205 The final product of ethanol is truly fungible 
and has “identical physical and chemical properties” regardless of 
                                                                                                             
Transp. Dist. of Or., 669 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir.2012) (establishing the standard 
of review for summary judgment motions as de novo); Black Star Farms LLC v. 
Oliver, 600 F.3d 1225, 1229 (9th Cir. 2010) (establishing that review of a district 
court’s resolution of constitutional claims is de novo). 
199. See Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1087 (determining the 
standard of review for appeals of preliminary injunction grants); see also 
Stormans Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1119 (9th Cir.2009) (establishing 
review of preliminary injunction grants as under an abuse of discretion 
standard). 
200. See Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1078 (“We hold that the Fuel 
Standard’s regulation of ethanol does not facially discriminate against out-of-
state commerce, and its initial crude oil provisions . . . did not discriminate 
against out-of-state crude oil in purpose or practical effect.”). 
201. See id. at 1088 (criticizing the district court’s use of “selective 
comparison” in evaluating fuel pathways). 
202. See id. at 1089 (“If we ignore these real differences between 
ethanol pathways, we cannot understand whether the challenged regulation 
responds to genuine threats of harm or to the mere out-of-state status of an 
ethanol pathway. All factors that affect carbon intensity are critical to 
determining whether the Fuel Standard gives equal treatment to similarly 
situated fuels.”).  
203. See id. at 1090 (explaining that “CARB’s method of lifecycle 
analysis treats ethanol the same regardless of origin”).  
204. See id. at 1088 (finding that the district court excluded 
relevant fuel pathways and contributors to GHG emissions).  
205. See id. (highlighting the faults in the district court’s evaluation 




the production methods.206 Therefore the district court erred in 
leaving Brazilian ethanol out of its analysis.207 Additionally, 
“[t]he district court also erred by ignoring GHG emissions related 
to: (1) the electricity used to power the conversion process, (2) the 
efficiency of the ethanol plant, and (3) the transportation of the 
feedstock, ethanol, and co-products.”208  
The elimination of these factors from the district court’s 
analysis is important because it removes the scientific validity of 
the assignment of carbon intensity values. Selectively analyzing 
factors of the statutory scheme allowed the district court to focus 
on the factors colored by origin, an analysis that would result in a 
determination that the factors were facially discriminatory 
against producers outside of California. This was an error by the 
district court even if the data was correlated with location.209 As 
the Ninth Circuit noted, “[a]ll factors that affect carbon intensity 
are critical to determining whether the Fuel Standard gives equal 
treatment to similarly situated fuels.”210  
The Ninth Circuit also reversed the district court’s holding 
that California impermissibly regulated beyond its borders.211 
The Ninth Circuit found that California could assign different 
values of carbon intensity to ethanol from different regions as 
long as its rationale is not solely based on origin.212 This is 
because California does not “base its treatment on a fuel's origin 
but on its carbon intensity.”213 The Fuel Standard only uses 
“location but only to the extent that location affects the actual 
GHG emissions attributable to a default pathway.”214  
                                                                                             
206. See id. (explaining why the comparisons made need to be 
different from the district court’s). 
207. See id. (finding error in the district court’s exclusion of 
Brazilian ethanol data). 
208. Id. 
209. See id. (stating the district court erroneously compared data 
without concern for the emissions created by the three ignored factors). 
210. Id. at 1089; see also, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 524 
(2007) (arguing that even an incremental step to reduce emissions is important 
to the Court’s analysis). 
211. See Rocky Mountain, 730 F.3d at 1101 (disagreeing with the 
district court that the Fuel Standard regulates extraterritorial conduct). 
212. See id. at 1089 (“[A] regulation is not facially discriminatory 
simply because it affects in-state and out-of-state interests unequally,” and 
different treatment must mean there are other reasons other than origin). 
213. Id. 
214. Id. 
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The Ninth Circuit reiterated that producers could apply 
for an individual determination of fuel intensity if they qualified 
under Method 2A or 2B.215 The Court found that California 
producers did not have a leg up in the individual pathway 
application process.216 Indeed, each individual producer was 
required to apply for, and have approved, his or her own 
individual pathway.217 The Court found that the burden and 
benefits to certain producers “are attributable to the imprecision 
of averages rather than to discrimination,” and concluded that 
“CARB gives ethanol producers in each regional category the 
substantially evenhanded treatment demanded by the Commerce 
Clause.”218 
The Ninth Circuit concluded CARB’s decision to create a 
regional category based on California’s border was not facially 
discriminatory.219 Though the Fuel Standard's categories were 
formed with reference to state boundaries, they treated ethanol 
from all sources evenhandedly showing a rationale apart from 
origin.220 The court explained that as of June 2011 there were no 
producers of corn ethanol in states neighboring California and 
that isolation provided legitimate justification for establishing 
California as one of the regional boundaries.221 “CARB's decision 
to align the regional categories as it did produced accurate carbon 
intensity values.”222 In addition, regional energy supplies also 
provided adequate justification for the regions created by 
                                                                                             
215. See id. at 1093–94 (explaining that the system is designed to 
avoid costly individualized determinations but that the alternative methods 
allow producers who are burdened by the default pathway to get an 
individualized assessment). 
216. See id. at 1094 (“Parties from all three regions have registered 
individualized pathways showing that the categories do not uniformly benefit 
California’s producers.”). 
217. See id. (explaining that a producer could not rely on the grant 
of a pathway to another producer). 
218. Id. (citations omitted). 
219. See id. (determining use of the California border was not 
facially discriminatory). 
220. See id. at 1096 (“The Fuel Standard’s regional categories for 
the default pathways show every sign that they were chose to accurately 
measure and control GHGs and were not an attempt to protect California 
ethanol producers.”). 
221. See id. (explaining that the closest producer was in Idaho, 





CARB.223 CARB utilizes the regional categories to make the 
default pathways more efficient and accurate for the regulated 
parties, and on top of this CARB provides a method for 
individualized pathways if the producers feel the default’s do not 
accurately reflect the carbon intensity of their methods.224  
This holding is extremely important for states seeking to 
draft emissions regulations. Utilization of regional categories can 
be an integral part of a regulatory scheme’s ability to withstand 
dormant Commerce Clause challenges, especially when combined 
with an individual determination method similar to the one used 
in the Fuel Standard. Basing valuations on region rather than by 
state can diminish the argument that a state is restricting 
interstate commerce. This is specifically when sources of 
emissions, methods of production, or resources, are starkly 
divided by region.  
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court 
determination that the fuel standard impermissibly regulates 
conduct beyond the state’s borders.225 The Ninth Circuit held that 
the fuel standard only regulated the California market.226 The 
statute did not “make [an] effort to ensure the price of ethanol is 
lower in California than in other states, and it imposes no civil or 
criminal penalties on non-compliant transactions completed 
wholly out of state.”227 The CA-GREET factors measure and 
consider numerous factors that exist outside of the state of 
California, “[b]ut California does not control these factors—
directly or in practical effect—simply because it factors them into 
the lifecycle analysis.”228  
Because the Ninth Circuit found that the district court 
erred in its application of strict scrutiny to the Fuel Standard, the 
court remanded the case back to the district court.229 The district 
court will be required to apply the Pike balancing test to 
                                                                                             
223. See id. (explaining the differences in regional energy sources). 
224. See id. at 1096 (explaining the utility of the different methods 
provided by the Fuel Standard). 
225. See id. at 1101 (“[N]o jurisdiction need adopt a particular 
regulatory standard for its producers to gain access to California.”). 
226. See id. (dismissing the rationale of the district court). 
227. Id. at 1103. 
228. Id. 
229. See id. at 1107 (noting that “[t]he Fuel Standard’s ethanol 
provisions are not facially discriminatory”). 
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determine if the Fuel Standard places a burden on interstate 
commerce that is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits.230 
 
V. Drafting Future Legislation 
 
 The Center for Climate and Energy Solutions has opined 
that “[t]wo trends are apparent with regard to state and regional 
efforts that address climate change: 1) more states are taking 
action and 2) they are adopting more types of policies.”231 As of 
March 2011, twenty-nine states have renewable portfolio 
standards.232 For these standards to be functional and long 
lasting they have to be drafted with the intent of surviving 
Commerce Clause challenges from out-of-state producers, or even 
neighboring states.233 Utilizing the RMFU decision and other 
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, this Note will now 
address some options for drafters of new environmental 
legislation or revisions to existing legislation. 
 
A. Acceptable Aims of Energy Regulation 
 
 Absent involvement from Congress, states that wish to be 
environmentally conscious will be required to take matters into 
their own hands.234 If a state seeks to address environmental 
regulation, their first consideration is establishing a permissible 
aim to the legislation.235 States should be prepared for their 
statutory or regulatory schemes to be attacked under the virtual 
                                                                                             
230. See id. (explaining how the district court should apply the 
Ninth Circuit’s ruling on remand). 
231. CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, CLIMATE CHANGE 
101: STATE ACTION 1, available at www.c2es.org/docUploads/climate-101-
state.pdf.  
232. See ELEFANT, supra note 72, at 3 (explaining the expansion of 
states utilizing renewable portfolio standards to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions). 
233. See id. at 4 (outlining considerations states should make in 
creating RPS). 
234. See Kunkleman, supra note 22 (quoting Lee C. Paddock in 
saying that “state initiatives are the ‘direct result of inaction by Congress’”). 
235. See ELEFANT, supra note 72, at 15 (stating that even when a 
facially neutral statute impacts interstate commerce the courts will require that 




per se invalidity test and the Pike’s balancing test.236 Therefore 
states must ensure there is a developed legislative history of a 
compelling state interest in regulating emissions.237 In the 
development of the statutes states should highlight findings of 
commissions and committees that support the regulation of 
emissions. The development of a compelling state interest will 
ensure that the state interest prongs of both tests will be 
satisfied. States should also include language in the purpose or 
goals section of environmental legislation emphasizing their 
desire to reduce emissions, though the impact of their state’s 
efforts might be negligible on a global scale.238  
 
B. Regulatory Structures 
 
 A stated legitimate purpose will not shield legislation that 
is facially discriminatory from a dormant Commerce Clause 
challenge.239 This section of the Note provides recommendations 
for drafting regulatory schemes to avoid dormant Commerce 
Clause challenges, first advising on the content of the regulatory 
scheme and second proposing alternative methods of regulation. 
 The first suggested method of drafting a regulatory 
scheme aimed at reducing emissions is to include relevant data 
inputs that are not simply based on origin.240 Ensuring that the 
data points are truly based on the creation of emissions and not 
                                                                                             
236. See id. at 5–9 (highlighting the Commerce Clause tests that 
can be applied to a RPS).  
237. See id. at 5–6 (emphasizing the importance of a compelling 
local interest when evaluating whether a RPS stands under the virtual per se 
invalidity test or the Pike balancing test).  
238. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522 (2007) (“That 
these climate-change risks are ‘widely shared’ does not minimize Massachusetts' 
interest in the outcome of this litigation.”). 
239. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 
(1978) (“Contrary to the evident assumption of the state court and the parties, 
the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative 
ends.”). 
240. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 
1088 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating the district court found the ethanol pathways 
discriminated based on origin). 
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simply based on the origin of the product is crucial.241 This is 
demonstrated in the default pathways that were established 
under the California fuel standard.242 CARB ensured that the 
data points that were being used to measure emissions during 
the life cycle of each fuel were only related to location where that 
was a factor in the emission of carbon.243 If pathways are created 
based simply on the location of origin of the fuel they will be 
categorized as facially discriminatory and will be challenged as 
unconstitutional.244 This method of focusing legislative efforts on 
the specifics of the emissions sources being regulated can be 
applied to legislation that aims to regulate other environmental 
harms in a way that mitigates the effectiveness of dormant 
Commerce Clause challenges.245  
The California Fuel Standard was also designed to avoid 
dormant Commerce Clause challenges through its allowance for 
individual determinations of pathways.246 Through the creation of 
three different pathways for producers to opt-in to, California 
allowed for out-of-state producers to submit their own production 
processes for carbon intensity analysis.247 Though on its own a 
provision such as this might not create a shield for dormant 
Commerce Clause liability, it would reduce the potential for 
challenges from out-of-state producers that utilized production 
                                                                                             
241. See id. at 1090 (approving of CARB’s method of lifecycle 
analysis because it treats “ethanol analysis the same regardless of origin” and 
focuses on the carbon intensity of an ethanol pathway). 
242. See id. at 1089 (“All factors that affect carbon intensity are 
critical to determining whether the Fuel Standard gives equal treatment to 
similarly situated fuels.”). 
243. See id. (stating that location was only considered only to the 
extent that it affected actual greenhouse gas emissions). 
244. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 
2d 1071, 1088 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (stating that a facially discriminatory statute is 
unconstitutional). 
245. See ELEFANT, supra note 72, at 14–18 (giving recommendations 
for Renewable Portfolio Standard statute drafting). 
246. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, § 95486 (2010) (establishing the 
different methods available to fuel producers). 
247. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 
1094 (asserting that Methods 2A and 2B allows for out-of-state producers to 




methods that were not common in California and therefore not 
included in the default pathways.248 
 Another recommended practice for drafters of 
environmental protection legislation comes from the Rocky 
Mountain Ninth Circuit decision that the regional determinations 
of CARB were not unconstitutional due to the narrow tailoring of 
regulated regions.249 If states are able to show a reasonable basis 
for where lines of regions are drawn they will be able to avoid 
dormant Commerce Clause challenges similar to those brought by 
RMFU. The Ninth Circuit held that the California border was a 
legitimate grouping because it was tailored to match the realities 
of ethanol production in the region.250 
 One option that has not been put into practice by any 
group of states would be forming a coalition to enact multi-
jurisdictional legislation that allowed for emissions monitoring, 
reporting, and regulating for a region or group of states. The 
enactment of such regulations would mitigate the concern of the 
dormant Commerce Clause of one state acting to the detriment of 
neighboring states. There is still a concern that states not inside 
the regional groupings could challenge the legislation for 
discriminating against interstate commerce. But if the groupings 
were drawn based on what is being regulated and regional 
similarities the potential of this would be diminished. An 
example of this could be a regional grouping of coastal states at 
the eastern seaboard drafting legislation to require a percentage 
of electricity be produced using ocean based wind power, or even 
tidal power plants. 
 Another potential alternative method of regulation can be 
the compensatory tax doctrine.251 The doctrine has been affirmed 
                                                                                             
248. See id. (concluding that the three methods provided by CARB 
establish even-handed treatment under the Commerce Clause).  
249. See id. at 1096 (“The Fuel Standard’s regional categories for 
the default pathways show every sign that they were chosen to accurately 
measure and control GHGs and were not an attempt to protect California 
ethanol producers.”).  
250. See id. at 1094 (holding that the California border was a 
legitimate regional grouping). 
251. See generally Heddy Bolster, The Commerce Clause Meets 
Environmental Protection: The Compensatory Tax doctrine as a Defense of 
Potential Regional Carbon Dioxide Regulation, 47 B.C. L. Rev. 737 (2006) 
(applying the compensatory tax doctrine to regulate “leakage” in tradition cap-
and-trade programs). 
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by the Supreme Court as a method of ensuring that no state, 
including the out-of-state party, gains an unfair advantage 
against another in interstate commerce.252 The compensatory tax 
doctrine would allow a state to impose taxes on out-of-state 
producers that are equivalent to the taxes imposed on in-state 
producers.253 The doctrine has three requirements for 
constitutionality: (1) the state must identify the interstate tax 
burden the State is attempting to compensate for, (2) the tax 
must be roughly approximate—but not exceed—that placed on 
interstate commerce, (3) finally, the events the tax is imposed on 
must be substantially equivalent.254 In Oregon Waste Systems, 
the Supreme Court held a tax on imported waste was not a valid 
application of the compensatory tax doctrine because the tax 
imposed on out-of-state waste was three times higher than that 
imposed on in-state waste.255 
 The doctrine could be used as an alternative to the 
California Fuel Standard’s cap-and-trade system.256 The tax could 
be imposed pro rata based on carbon emissions that were 
established through the lifecycle analysis. Carbon intensity 
values could be broken into ranges with each range carrying a 
different level of tax liability. The system would encourage 
producers to change to alternative energy in an attempt to lower 
their overall tax liability. The burden that would be imposed on 
out-of-state producers would identical to that of in-state 
producers because the tax liability would be tied to overall 
emissions and not to the origin of the producer. 
 A final recommendation is one that states can utilize if—
or more likely when—they are faced with a dormant Commerce 
Clause challenges. States considering drafting legislation aimed 
at environmental protection—whether it is a cap-and-trade 
                                                                                             
252. See Dep’t of Revenue of Wash. v. Assoc. of Wash. Stevedoring 
Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 748 (1978) (stating that no state should get more than a just 
share of interstate commerce). 
253. See Bolster, supra note 251, at 749–50 (discussing the case 
Hinson v. Lott, 75 U.S. 148 (1869), and an Alabama law imposing a tax on out-
of-state liquor distillers equivalent to the tax imposed on in-state distillers). 
254. See Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 103 
(1994) (explaining the requirements of the compensatory tax doctrine). 
255. See Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 108 (finding the tax 
unconstitutional because of the unequal burden imposed on out-of-state waste). 
256. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(c) (West 2007) 




system, a Renewable Portfolio Standard, or a regulatory scheme 
that hasn’t even been thought of yet—should always be mindful 
of alternative regulatory schemes to what they are implementing. 
States should consider why these regulatory schemes are not 
feasible in their situation. States should make an attempt to 
document why regulatory schemes could not possibly be 
successful under their unique circumstances. If faced with a 
dormant Commerce Clause challenge states should present 
evidence to the courts that will satisfy the dormant Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence requiring that states acted with no non-
discriminatory alternatives available. Though this 
recommendation is a last resort it is something that has worked 




 Due to a lack of Congressional action, and until there is 
more Congressional action, states will be required to establish 
their own environmental regulatory schemes. The nature and 
scope of the environmental problem means these regulatory 
schemes will impact interstate commerce and therefore implicate 
the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution. As of this writing, California’s Fuel Standard 
awaits a review under the less intensive Pike balancing test in 
the district court. The Ninth Circuit has denied RMFU’s petition 
for a rehearing en banc.258 RMFU’s petition for certiorari to the 
United States Supreme Court has also been denied.259 
This Note introduced you to the jurisprudence, relevant 
tests, and historical application of the dormant Commerce 
Clause. Through the lens of Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, v. 
Corey this Note has provided direction to states looking to 
understand the drafting requirements of environmental 
                                                                                             
257. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986) (finding a 
statute, which discriminated on its face by restricting the importation of baitfish 
in Maine, was acceptable under dormant Commerce Clause analysis because 
Maine had a legitimate local interest in keeping non-native baitfish out of its 
waters which could not be served by a nondiscriminatory alternative). 
258. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 740 F.3d 507 (9th 
Cir. 2014). 
259. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 134 S. Ct. 2875, 189 
L. Ed. 2d 835 (2014). 
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legislation that avoids dormant Commerce Clause challenges. If 
states are able to follow these recommendations their 
environmental legislation will be effective and—hopefully—
protected from such challenges.  
